Forgery Investigation
this will give you an idea of what’s involved in solving a crime and techniques used
On 26 September, a female customer entered the campus bookstore. She purchased textbooks totaling $320.70 at 0927 hours. The customer reentered the store later that day, and at 1720 hours purchased a computer and an AC adapter in the amount of $2261.66. She made both purchases by check, and wrote a perm
number on the checks. When she attempted to make her computer purchase, the department called the bank twice and was told that the account did not have sufficient funds. The customer was advised by a computer sales representative that the Bookstore does not call the bank if the amount is under $2000.00. She told the sales representative that she would go to the ATM and retrieve $300. She did so, then returned and completed the purchase.
On 7 October Asset Protection was contacted by the accounting manager, who said that the Bookstore had received back two checks for nonsufficient funds. Accounting personnel had called the bank and were told
that this was a student account in Yorba Linda. A bank employee stated that there were not any funds in the account, and added that it had been an active account at one time. Vault personnel checked their roster, and found that the name imprinted upon the checks did not match the names of anyone currently attending
UCSB. The vault manager asked if our department would look into the matter.
Asset Protection obtained a copy of the two transaction journal tapes that showed what books were purchased, the register used, the cashier, and the time of the sale. Next, we reviewed the Asset
Protection CCTV tapes. We observed the female making the morning textbook purchase. As she walked away from the cash ring, her bag broke, and her books fell onto the floor. She went to a
cashier and obtained a new bag. Five minutes later, it appears that she walks to the refund window and returns a number of books. A Bookstore employee who we will identify as X assists her. In the
afternoon tape, the same female is seen in the Computer Department attempting to purchase a laptop computer. Then, she walks away (to get money from the ATM), comes back, and completes the transaction.
Asset Protection examined the name on the checks, and confirmed that the person was not a college student by reviewing the current student roster. An investigation of the ID number used by the female customer revealed that it belonged to a male student. Interestingly, the name was same as the male who we had earlier identified as X. Next, we checked to see if the female customer possessed a CA driver’s license, and found that there was no license issued in that name. The check’s address, in Yorba Linda, was investigated, and we found that the address used is fictitious. The phone numbers on the checks were called, and Spanish speakers answered both. I asked both parties if they knew our female, how long they had possessed their phone number, and if they had taken in any boarders. It was determined that the
numbers were false. The computer invoice’s warranty information was inspected and found to be false, as well. The PO box used is non -existent.
Subsequently, we reviewed all the refund slips for the 26th, and found no slip with the name on the check, or more importantly for the book titles that the female customer had purchased. Asset Protection then checked all the week’s refunds, and even two dirty trash cans. We still could not find the refund slip.
Next, we obtained employee X’s job application. The application was checked against the ID information we had obtained earlier. The only difference between his name, and the name attached to the perm number written on the checks by the female customer, was the middle initial. It was learned that X’s first name was an alias and his first name was the same letter as the middle initial on the perm information. Then, Asset Protection discovered that X had never been a student, or a student in the College system. We did find out that he had attended City College. A quick examination of a local city college’s Ids revealed that they were not similar to the campus ID numbers. An interview with X determined he was not connected with this case, nor did he know the female. He stated that when he works the refund window he ALWAYS checks the refunder’s ID and compares it with the refund slip.
Armed with this information, we reviewed the refund slips. We checked the time on the register to the actual time from our cameras. We calculated the difference and matched the slips. We obtained the photos of three females in the appropriate time frame. We checked the photo with the picture at the refund window, and determined that they were a match. Asset Protection phoned the female customer whose transaction followed the suspect refund. She positively identified herself as the female customer at the refund window. This confirmed that the suspect photo and refund slip were the ones that we were looking for. Next, we showed the photo to the cashier, who had helped the suspect pick up her spilled books, as well as to the computer employee. Neither person could provide a positive ID, but both said it was close.
Subsequently, Asset Protection reviewed the CCTV tapes to compare the female at the refund window with the female seen purchasing the books and computer. We had a positive ID on the book and computer transactions. The refund picture was enhanced, as well as the books purchase picture. The two women looked so much alike, it was difficult to tell the difference. The female, with the books, wore Teva shoes and the other wore black flats. Both wore white tee shirts, but the refunder had a small collar. Using a side-by-side comparison, it was determined that they were two different people. What is really wild is that both had the same hairstyle, cowlick on the left side, and the same color clothing. The female at the refund window was cleared of any involvement.
Employing the journal tape, we checked the SKU number to determine what books were purchased. Utilizing this list, we reviewed the Class Schedule to determined what books were used
in the class, and where the classes were located. A.P. agents attended approximately 15 different classes before the female customer was spotted. Next, we reviewed our evidence tape to
confirm her identity. Asset Protection agents returned to the class the next day. The class roster was obtained from the professor. All male names were eliminated, and an Access search was
conducted. We found the customer’s picture, and had an Access card copy made. This was compared with the evidence tape, and positive ID was made. The computer employee made a positive ID of the suspect, as well.
Next, we checked with the Post Office and found that she used a postal box. An emergency address and phone number was listed on her post box application. While she signed her own name, the signature is identical to the forged computer check.
Later, A.P. agents went to the customer’s class and observed her leaving the lecture hall. She walked to the bike racks and rode away on a new yellow Trek 1500 bicycle. On 10/18/97, one of our agents observed her arriving at school in a new silver Honda. When she walked away from her car, the agent obtained the vehicle identification number, as there was no license plate. The agent further observed that the yellow bicycle was stored in the back of the car. The address obtained from the VIN came back to a PO
box. Further investigation revealed that the customer was taking a MSAT test in order to prepare for medical school admission.
Next, the emergency number, from the PO box, was called. The person who answered was told that the caller was updating addresses for the Registrar’s Office. The person called then revealed the address of the suspect. UCSB Police obtained an arrest and search warrant. When they initially attempted to serve
the warrant, the suspect was not home. The police called Asset Protection to determine what class they could find the suspect at on Friday. We advised the Campus Police that she attended a class in
the Chemistry Building at 11:00 am on that day. Our agents assisted the police in locating and identifying the suspect. The police took her into custody.
An interview by the detective sergeant was conducted. We were informed that the suspect was very difficult to interview. A criminal history check showed past arrests. The suspect stated that she
began forging checks in Los Angeles. A male whom she would not identify recruited her into a forgery gang. She joined the gang in 1993. They were successful in making countless purchases without
ever being caught. She maintained that the gang is still active in the L.A. area, but would not give further details. The suspect obtained the checks by using false identification, provided by the gang, to open new accounts. Addresses, phone numbers, etc. were all false, so as not to leave a paper trail to any of the suspects. She added that they would never hit a business twice, on the chance that they
might be identified. These were truly a group of “professionals”, who had been “ghosts” until our suspect chose to target the Bookstore. She stated that whenever she purchased an item using
the forged checks, she would destroyed all receipts and paper work. A search of the residence was conducted. The computer from the Bookstore was found, with the serial number obliterated. Other
items found included a TV (serial number removed), desk, chair, books, etc. She had destroyed all paperwork on the items, as well as the checks. The suspect wanted the items to be untraceable.
She was extremely surprised that she was caught!! The detective sergeant said that the suspect started talking when she learned that we had her on CCTV tapes, and when she saw the photos (from
our thermal printer) of her making the purchases.
The suspect was booked into custody at county jail on Friday Oct. 24. Her bail was set at $50,000. The District Attorney’s Office had received numerous checks on the forged account from merchants in
the Santa Barbara area. Their investigators were unable to identify the suspect. Now that she is identified and in custody, the D.A.’s office can prosecute the local cases. Finally, with the leads
generated in this case, the L.A. connection can be investigated.
